



LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES FOR FRAUD,
ACCIDENT, DELAY AND MISTAKES IN THE TRANS-
MISSION AND DELIVERY OF MESSAGES.
PART I.-NATURE AND DUTIES Op TELEGRAPH OMPANIES.-
PRACTICE.
§ 1. .elation of Telegraph Companie8 to the Public.-Seldom,
if ever, in the history of the world, has an industry grown in so
short a time, to such vast proportions as has the business of
transmitting messages from place to place by means of the electric
telegraph.
Forty years ago there was not a telegraph line in the world,
to-day there are nearly three hundred thousand miles of wire in
this country alone, and our telegraph companies have an aggre-
gate capital of about $100,000,000. In 1880 they transmitted
31,700,181 messages. They have become a gigantic power, and
have taken their place alongside of steamship and railroad com-
panies as great public agencies necessary to the life of commerce.
About eighty per cent. of all telegrams are commercial. Some of
them are so important, that a mistake or fraudulent change in
transmission, is liable to cause the loss of thousands, and in extreme
cases, even of hundreds of thousands o dollars.
It is, therefore, important for every lawyer to understand ex-
actly what the legal relation of these companies is to the public,
and what their liabilities and duties are.
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In two early cases, Parks v. Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422
(1859), and Mac Andrew v. The Aectric Co., 17 C. B. (Eng.)
3 (1855), they were held to be common carriers; but in other
early cases the courts, when they considered the nature and power
of electricity, thought it so strange, wonderful and incomprehen-
sible, that no ordinary human care or skill could possibly suffice
to control it perfectly, and, deeming it therefore unjust to hold tele-
graph companies bodnd by the strict rules which govern common
carriers, sought out reasons for making a distinction between
these new carriers of thought and the old carriers of merchandise.
Able attorneys supplied them with apparent reasons, and they
declared that telegraph companies were not insurers and should
not be regarded as carriers. In that opinion, all the American.
courts which have expressed any decided opinion on this subject,
have, with the exception above mentioned, concurred: El/iit V.
Am. Tel. Co., 13 Allen 226; De RBUte v. Te New York , J-.,
Tel. Co., 1 Daly 547; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 625;
Grinnell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299; W. U. Tel. Co., v.
Bertram, 1 Tex. App. (Cir. Cas.), sect. 1152; Birney v. . Y.,
t.c., Tel. Co., 18 Md. 358; Pickn y v. Tel. Co. (Sup. Ct. S. C.),
16 Reporter 635.
In the.last three of the cases above cited, telegraph companies
are said to be "bailees," but the courts have generally been satis:.
fled to either leave their position undefined, or call them public or
quasi public agents, without stating whether they consider them
bailees or not.
In the case of W. -U. Tel. Co. v. .Fontaine, 58 Geo. 433, the
majority of the judges, including the chief justice, were of the
opinion that the appellant was not a common carrier; but JACK-
SON, J., who concurred in the result reached by the other judges,
but not in their reasoning, stated, that in his opinion, the appel-
lant was a common carrier of messages, and that its liabilities were
the same as those of other carriers. And it is believed by the
writer, after an examination.of all the cases, that the doctrine
enunciated in Judge JACKSON'S opinion, and in the two cases first
cited, is the correct one.
It has, indeed, been argued, that the duties of telegraph com-
panies are wholly different from those of carriers of goods, becausa,
- it is said, a carrierohas exclusive control of goods he undertakes to
transport, with peculiar opportunities for embezzlement or bollu-
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sion with thieves; that the identity of the goods received with
those delivered cannot be mistaken; that their value is of easy
estimation and may be ascertained by inquiry, and the carrier's
compensation fixed accordingly; and that on the other hand a
telegraph company is entrusted with nothing but an order or mes-
sage, which is not to be carried in the form in which it is received,
but copied and a copy delivered; that in the transmission there is
a peculiar liability of making mistakes ; that a telegram cannot be
embezzled; that it has no intrinsic value; that it may be of very
great or of no importance ; that only one rate of compensation can
be fixed for telegrams, whether important or not; and that the
measure of damages has no relation to any value which can be
placed upon the message itself: Grinnell v. TV. U. Tel. Co., 113
Mass. 299. But it is respectfully submitted, that the alleged dif-
ferences are apparent rather than real. Telegraph companies are
given possession of telegrams and their agents may embezzle them,
as.they sometimes have, and may enter into collusion with thieves;
moreover, a message certainly can be stolen. In Strause v. TV. U.
Tel. Co., 8 Biss. C. Ct. 104, an important message had been safely
transmitted and given to a messenger to deliver. The messenger
negligently permitted a stranger to gain possession of it and sub-
stitute a forged one of a different import in its place. The forgery
was delivered and the receiver damaged, and the company was held
liable.
As to the difficulty in establishing the identity of the message
delivered with the one received, the difference is only one of degree,
and the fact that the mode of establishing such identity differs in
the two cases is immaterial.
It is denied that it is always easy for a carrier to estimate the
value of merchandise entrusted to it. Merchandise is usually
delivered to carriers in boxes, or otherwise hidden from view, and
both its valub and nature have to be, and habitually are, learned
from the shipper. The nature and importance of a telegram can be
learned with equal ease from the sender, and there seems to be no
good reason why different rates should not be charged for messages
of different grades of importance, as well as for different kinds of
merchandise; neither is it true that a telegraph company does not
undertake to carry anything, but merely to make a copy of a
writing and deliver the copy. The thing its undertaking relates
to, is the message sent, which is placed by the sender on one piece
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of paper furnished by the company, and delivered on another piece
furnished by the compaty, just as merchandise' is received by
express companies on one of their vehicles which they use for col-
lecting freight and delivered on another. The paper on hioh the
message is delivered is simply one of the means of transportation
which the nature of the business necessitates.
The fact that the mode of. transportation is novel, is of no conse-
quence; pipe companies, which transport petroleum for hire through
pipes, have been held to be common carriers: Jones v. Tannier,
27 Pitts. L. . 79.
Tlegraph companies are undoubtedly liable to make mistakes,
just as other carriers are liable to fail in -their undertakings, and
like other carriers, have to contend against uncontrollable force '
and against accidents which -no care or skill can avert; but, 'ii
spite of all that has been said to the contrary, they do not appear
to be peculiarly liable to error. That -they are not, is proven by
the small number of suits'that have been brought against themi
In many states, no case against a telegraph company has ever
reached the Supreme Court. Only one case is to be -found in the
Missouri reports; only three cases in all the Federal repofts. AU-.
the reported andsome unreported American cases are cited in thj
article. The courts have been deceived as to the difficulties which
these companies have to contend against.
Again it is said, telegrams have no intrinsic value; but what of
that, they certainly very often have a great pecuniary importance,
capable of being ascertained by the parties interested. The fact
that they are frequently worthless, if not transmitted and delivered
promptly, is of no consequence The same thing is true of certain
very perishable articles of merchuise.
In concluding the discussion of this-pent, it may be said, that
notwithstanding the uniformity of the langiig-.- of the decis-
ions, there are few cases in which 'the result reached might not
have been reachled just as well if the defendant had been con-
sidered a carrier, and these few are of doubtful authority, and
relate to questions as to the burden of proof and the ability of tle-
graph companies to limit their liability for negligence. They will
be referred to hereafter. I -
§ 2. -tatutorj Provision-Common Lu-Ipartia~iti-.LVe-
ligence.-In most of Qur states statutes have been enacted providing
in substance, that companies engaged in telegraphing for the public
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shall, during the usual office hours, receive dispatches, whether
from other telegraph lines or from individuals, and on payment or
tender of the usual charges according to the regulations of such
companies, shall transmit the same with impartiality and good faith,
and in the order of time in which they are received, and shall be
liable in damages for any breach of duty.
In the case of -Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co., 13 Allen 226, it was said,
that the effect of a M1assachusetts statute of that description, was to
take the business of conducting and managing a line of electric
telegraph within that Commonwealth out of the class of ordinary
private occupations, and make it a quasi public employment, to be
carried on with a view to the general benefit and for the accommo-
dation of the community. But in reality, such statutes are only
declaratory of the common law. Telegraph companies are bound
to serve the public faithfully, skilfully and impartially, whether
any statute commands it or not. Their duty to do so arises from
the very nature of their employment: . U. Tel. Co. v. Graham,
1 Col. (Tr.) 230 ; Bartlett v. W. U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209 ; Turn-
pike Co. v. .News Co., 14 Vroom 383; -Davis v. F. U. Tel. Co., 1
Cin. Sup. Ct. 100; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Neill, 57 Tex. 283; State
v. Am. . -E. C. News Co., 14 Yroom 381 ; N. Y. & W. Printing
Tel. Co. v. .Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298; Parks v. Alta Cal. Tel.
Co., 13 Cal. 422 ; Sweatland v. 1ll. &. Miss. Tel. Co., 27 Ia. 433 ;
Baldwin et al. v. U. S. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744; Aiken v. Tel.
Co., 5 S. C. 358.
The statutes of New York, Indiana and some other states,
provide that telegraph companies shall be liable in a penal sum for
any breach of their statutory duties, and in a suit for the statutory
penalty under the New York statute, it was held, in the case of
Marvin et al. v. I. U. Tel. Co., 15 Chic. L. N. 416, that a
refusal to receive a telegram unless it was sent "subject to delay,"
was a breach of the company's duty to receive; and in a suit to
recover the statutory penalty for a failure to transmit, under the
Indiana statute, it has been held, that though a telegraph com-
pany is not bound to transmit a message couched in indecent,
obscene or filthy language, the fact that the company's agent
believed the object of the message immoral, is no excuse for failing
to transmit.
§ 3. -Who may Sue-Form of Action.-Where a telegraph
company fails to comply with a contract to transmit and deliver a
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message sent at the expense, and for the sole benefit of the sender,
the sender, and he only, can maintain an action on the contract:
Guf, c., Railway (o. v. Levy, 28 Alb. L. J. (Tex.) 192; or he
may, at his option, sue on the case; Koons v. W. U. Tel. Co.
(Sup. Ct. Pa.), 16 Reporter 472; Squire v. . U. Tel. Co., 98
Mass. 232. Where, however, the contract with the company is
made for the benefit of the person to whom the telegram is sent,
either by his agent (If. U. Tel. Co. v. Weiting, 1 Tex. App. (Cir.
Cas.), sect. 801 ; Davis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 1 Cin. Sup. Ct. 100;
.De Butte v. V. Y., &c., Tel. Co., 1 Daly 547), or a stranger
(Gulf, &c., Railway Co. v. Levy, 8upra), he is regarded as the
real party to the contract, and can maintain an action upon it.
And where the price of transmission has been charged to him
(De Butte v. N. Y., &¢c., Tel. Co,, aupra), or the message las
been sent C. 0. D. (La Grange v. Southweterm Tel. Co., 25
La. Ann. 383; National Bank v. Tel. Co., 30 Ohio St. 555), the
sender will be presumed to have acted as his agent in contracting
with the company.
Where the contract for transmission is for the sole benefit of the
sender, and the person to whom the message is sent is damaged by
a mistake in transmission made through the company's negligence
(Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298; Bose v. U. S. Tel.
Co., 6 Rob. (Ni. Y.) 307; Harris v. . U. Tel. Co., 9 Phila. 88;
contra, Plaford v. U. K. Tel. Co. (Eng.), Allen's Tel. Cas.
437), or through the company's negligently permitting a forgery to
be substituted for the genuine message, and delivering the forgery
(Strause v. . U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. Cir. Ct. 104), his only
remedy is an action on th6 case; but the right of the person to
'whom a message is sent, to maintain an action on the case for non-
delivery or delay in delivering, where the comtract with the com-
pany is not for his benefit, seems very doubtful on principle,
though it has been recognised in Texas in the case of Gulf, ec.,
Railway Co. v. Levy, supra, and is held in Indiana to be conferred
by a statute providing that any telegraph company, which fails to
transmit and deliver a telegram which it has undertaken to trans-
mit, "shall be liable for special damages :" Wf. U. Tel. Co. v.
Fenton, 52 Ind. 1.
The only reported case in which the plaintiff has asked for dam-
ages occasioned by the negligent delivery of a telegram to him,
appearing on its face to have been sent to him, but nmeant by the
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sender for another persoii, is the case of -Dickson et al. v. Beuter's
Tel. Co., 17 Am. L. Reg.J.$S.) 222, decided by the English Court
of Appeal. The court held, in that case, that there could be no
recovery; but if a similar case ever comes before an American
court the ruling will probably be different.
PART II.-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
§ 4. Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.-In an action for the
breach of a contract to transmit and deliver a telegram, the meas-
ure of damages is the same as for the breach of any other contract.
The rule laid down by ALDERSON, B., in the famous case of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, and which has been referred
to with approval in nearly every telegraph ease in which any ques-
tion as to the measure of damages has arisen, is as follows:
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract, should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be donsidered either arising naturally, i. e., accord-
ing to the usual course of things from such- breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract,
as the probable result of this breach of it. Now, if the special cir-
cumstances under which the contract was actually made, were com-
municated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and thus known to
both parties, the damages resulting from this breach of such con-
tract which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of
contract under these special circumstances, so known and com-
municated. But, on the other hand, if those special circumstances
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the
most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the
amount of injury which would hrise generally, and in the great
multitude of cases, not affected by any special circumstances, for
such a breach of contract."
In the case of Leonard v. N. Y., 'c., Tel. Co., 41 N. Y. 544,
EARL, 0. J., laid down the rule, as follows:
"A party is liable for all the direct damages which both parties
to the contract would have contemplated as flowing from its breach,
if, at the time they entered into it, they had bestowed proper
attention upon the subject, and had been fully informed of the
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facts." And his language has been quoted with approval in -1W.,
U. Tel. Co. v. Bertram et al., 1 Tex. App. (Cir. Cas.), sect. 1152;
1W. U. Tel. Co. v. Weiting, Id. 801, and National Bank v. W.
U. oTel. Co., 30 .Ohio St. 555.
The manner in which the general rule has been applied to par-
ticular cases, will appear from the following sections:
§ 5. Mistakes leading to the Shipment of -terchandise not
ordered.-In the case of Leonard v. T. Y., fo., Tel. Co., supra,
the message sent was an order to the plaintiff's agent to ship five
thousand sacks of salt from Oswego to Chicago. The word
"sacks" was changed, through the negligence of the company's
agent, to "casks," and five thousand casks were in consequence
shipped instead of that number of sacks. When the salt reached
Chicago it was worth much less than its market value in Oswego
at the time it was shipped, and the measure of damages was held
to be the difference between the market value of the surplus, -over
what was ordered at Oswego, when it was shipped, and its market
value at Chicago, when it rrived there, together with the cost of
transportation and interest from the date of the arrival of the salt
at its destination.
§ 6. Rule where Mistakes cause the Purchase of Jerchandige.
-In the case of Washington J6 New Orleans Tel. (lo. v. Hobson
et al., 15 Gratt. 122, it ppeared that the appellees had sen a mes-
sage by the appellant, to their factor at Mobile, ordering him to
purchase five hundred bales of cotton on their account. The mes-
sage, as delivered to the, factor, read "twenty-five hundred bales,'"
and, in pursuande of the order delivered to him, he purchased two
thousand and seventy-eight bales before the mistake was discovered.
The price of cotton fell, and'the appellees sued the company for
damages, after first requesting it to tavie the surplus over what
they had ordered off their hands, and pay the factor's commissions.
The court held that the measure of damages was the differenco
between the price paid for the surplus cotton, and the price at
wlich it could have been sold at Mobile after the mistake was dis-
covered, together with the commissions of the factor. It was also
held in that case, that where merchandise is bought in consequence
of a mistake in a telegram, the person for whom it is bought should,
if he intends to hold the company responsible, notify it of his
intention, and tender the merchandise to it on the condition of its
paying the price and all the charges incident to the purchase; and
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should also notify the company that, in case of a refusal to accept
on those terms, the merchandise will be sold on its account.
But in the case of Rittenhouse v. The Independent Line of
Telegraph, 1 Daly 474, which was decided six years later, such
notice and tender were held unnecessary. That was a case in which
the plaintiffs had telegraphed to their brokers, "If we have any
old Southern on hand, sell same before board. Buy five Hudson
at board." By a mistake in transmission, "hundred" was sub-
.stituted for Hudson, and the broker accordingly bought five hun-
dred shares Michigan Southern Railway stock. Before the mistake
was discovered the stock bought fell in value, and the stock ordered
rose, and the plaintiffs were held to be entitled to recover both the
loss on the stock purchased, and the gain that would have been
made on the shares ordered bought, if they had been purchased.
The same principles were applied in ,W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bertram
et al., supra, which was an action for damages for failure to deliver
to Thompson & Co., of New Orleans, the following dispatch, viz.:
"1 Cancel order given Maillet yesterday." The order referred to
was one for ninety-five barrels of sugar, which the appellees had
ordered. They had ascertained, after giving the order, that they
could do better, and desired it cancelled for that reason. The
telegram was not delivered and the appellees had to take the sugar.
The court held that they were entitled to recover the difference
between the price they paid for it and the price at which they
could have bought, if their.dispatch had been delivered.
§ 7. Delay causing Loss of Debt.-In the case of Parks v.
Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 18 Cal. 422, the message sent was "Due
1800. Attach if you can find property; will send note by to-
morrow's stage." The opportunity to attach and the debt were
both lost through the company's delay in transmitting the message,
and the company was held liable for the amount of the debt.
In the case of Bryant v. The Am. Tel. (Co., 1 Daly 575, the
facts were similar and the same measure was applied.
§ 8. Failure to Deliver causing Sender to go to Useless .EX-
pense.-In the case of Sprague v. W. U. Tel. Co., 6 Daly 200,
the plaintiff, who at that time had a case pending in Buffalo, but
lived at another place, telegraphed to the clerk of the court before
which his case was pending, "Hold my case till Tuesday or
Thursday. Please reply." The message was not delivered, and
the plaintiff, after waiting until the next day for an answer, con-
VOL. 1 I.-37
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COAMPAIES
eluded that his case had not been held over, and went with counsel
to Buffalo to try it. Upon arriving at Buffalo, however, he found
his case had been laid over till the next week, and went back
home again. Under the facts as above stated, -the court held,
that the measure of damages included the expense of going to
Buffalo and returning with counsel, and the counsel's fee for th"
trip.
Expenses were also allowed in the case of T. U. Tel. Co. v.
Weiting, 1 Tex. App. (Cir. Cas.), sect. 801. In that case they.
were caused by an unreasonable delay.
§ 9. Loss of .Profits.-In the case of Graham v. W. U. TA.
Co., 1 Col. , the plaintiff, who desired to have coal oil belong.
ing to him, and then at Nebraska City, shipped to Denver, tele-
graphed to his agent at the former place, "Ship oil soon as
possible at very best rates fou can." In. conseqUence of a failure
to transmit the message there was a delay in shipping the oil, and
higher rates of freight had to.be paid than-would have been charged
if the oil had been shipped when the message should have .been
delivered, and profits which would have been realized in a sale of
the oil if the telegram had been delivered, were lost in consequence
of the market price of the oil falling. The measure of damages
was held to include the increase in the price of freight, and ill
expenses to -which the plaintiff was put by th6 company's failure
to transmit, but not the profits which might have been realized.
Inasmuch as the message did not indicate that a sale was contem-
plated, the decision was undoubtedly correct; but where the
message is an order to buy or sel, or an acceptance of an offer to.
sell, and profits are lost through the company's negligence, they
may be recovered. Thus, in the case of True v. International
Tel. 0o.,. 60 Me. 9, the message sent'was, ""Ship cargo named at
ninety, if you can secure, freight at ten-wire us result." The
message was not delivered, and the plaintiffs failed to secure the
cargo of corn at the terms offered, and the price of corn and
the rate of freight advanced immediately. The plaintiffs conse-
quently lost the profits which they might have made on the pur-
chase, and were obliged to buy other corn at higher prices; and the
court held that they were entitled to recover both the increase in
the amount which had to be paid for freight, and the difference
between the price named and that which they would have been
obliged to pay at the same place, in order, by due diligence, after
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notice of the failure of the telegram, to purchase the like quantity
and quality of corn.
The same principles have been applied, as to profits, in Bartlett
v. W. U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Weiting, 1
Tex. App. (Cir. Cas.), sect. 801; I. U. Tel. Co. v. Pettis, (S. C.
Tex.), 18 Cent. L. J. 39; U. S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Penn. St.
262; Mfanville v. W. U. Tel. Co., 37 Ia. 214, and Bittenhouse
v. Independent Line Tel. Co., 44 N. Y. 263, which were cases in
contract; and in Squire et al. v. N. Y. Cent. Bailway go., 98
Mass. 239, and Bowen et al. v. Lake Er'ie Tel. Co., Allen's Tel.
Cas. 7, which were actions on the case. But see, Hibbard et al. v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 558.
§ 10. Obscure fessages.-In applying the rule in .Hadley v.
Baxendale, to obscure messages, the courts have held that where a
dispatch is so worded that neither its nature nor its object can be
understood by the telegraph company which undertakes to transmit
it, and no explanation of its meaning is furnished to the company
by the sender, the measure of damages in case of a breach of
the company's contract, is the amount paid for transmission:
Shields v. Washington Tel. Co., Allen's Tel. Cas. 5; Stevenson v.
The Montreal Tel. Co., 16 Up. Can. Q. B. 530: Baldwin v. U. S.
Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744. But a message is not obscure within the
meaning of the rule or of regulations as to obscure messages, if it
appears on its face to be an order to a broker or agent to buy: U.
S. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Penn. St. 262; Rittenhouse v. Inde-
pendent Line of Tel., 44 N. Y. 263; or sell, Bittenhouse v. Inde-
pendent Line of Tel., 44 N. Y. 263; Tyler et al. v. IV. U. Tel.
Co., 60 Ill. 421; or an offer to buy: Telegraph Co. v. Griswold,
37 Ohio St. 301; or an acceptance of an* offer to sell, as for
instance, "1 Ship your hogs at once," Manville v. I. U. Tel. Co.
37 Ia. 314; or " Will take your hogs at your offer, our man will be
there Tuesday morning," Squire v. If. U. Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232
(Contra, Beaupre et al. v. P. J A. Tel. Co. 21 Minn. 155, in which
message was "Dispatch received. Will take two hundred extra mess,
price named.") It has even been held sufficient to take a message
out of the rule if it shows on its face that it relates to a business
transaction, as in X1 U. Tel. Co. v. Blanchard et al., 68 Ga. 299;
where message was "C over two hundred September and one hun-
dred August:" Pope v. W. U. Tel. Co., 9 Brad. 285, where
message was, "Money will be with Perine Brown by twelve; don't
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sell ;" W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bertram, 1 Tex. App. (Cir. Cas.), where
message was " Cancel order given Maillet yesterday.;' but this last
point is not entirely settled: Shields v. Washington Tel. Co., supra;
MeColl v. W. U. Tel. Co., 7 Abb. N. Cas. 151 ; Stevenson v. The
Montreal Tel. Co., Up. Can. Q. B. 580; U. S. Tel. Co. v. Gilder-
sleve, 29 Md. 232.
§ 11. 6apher .Ditpatches.-Cipher dispatches come within the
rule as to obscure messages, and the only damages which can be
received in an action for a breach of contract to transmit such a
message is the price paid for transmission.
The leading case on this point is Sanders et al. v. Stuart, I
Com. P1. Div. (Eng.) 326. The defendant in that case was' a
person who made his living by collectingmessages and transmitting
them by telegraph to America and other countries. This suit was
brought to recover damages suffered in consequence.of his negligence
in failing to transmit a cipher dispatch which he had received from
the plaintiff for transmission, Lord COLERIDGE, C. J., in delivering
the opinion of the court said: "We think the rule in Hadley v.
Bazendale applies, and that the damages recoverable are nominal
only."
The rule in Hadley v. Bazendale was also applied in (Jandee v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 84 Wis. 473; Mackay v. W. U. Tel. Co., -16 Nev.
223; and W. U. Tel. o. v. Martin, 9 Brad. (In.) 587; and
appears to have been followed in a case recently decided by Chan-
cellor SimitAI, of Kentucky, 15 Chic. L. N. 220.
Pinckney v. Tel. Co. (Sup. Ct. S. C.), 16 Reporter 635, was a
case in which a mistake was made in transmitting a message written
•in cipher, but the rule as to cipher dispatches was not referred to by
the court in deciding it.
, The only cipher dispatch case in which compensatory damages
have been allowed is the case of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Weiting, 1 Tex.
App. (Cir. Cas.) 801 ; but the dispatch in that case appeared on its
face to relate to the purchase of merchandise, and consequently does
not come within the rule. The first part of the message sent was
in cipher, but the concluding sentence was: "Get good selection,
for party is large buyer," was written in plain English.
§ 12, Measure of Damages in Actions in Tort.-In actions in
tort, all damages'which are the natural and proximate consequence
of the wrongful act whether in the contemplation of the wrongdoer
at the time he committed the wrong or not, may be recovered, and
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where the wrong is flagrant vindictive damages may be awarded:
W. U. Tel. Co. y. Penton, 52 Ind. 1; . . W. P. Tel. Co. v.
D burg, 35 Penn. St. 298; .Bowen et al. v. Lake Brie Tel. Co.,
Allen's Tel. Cas. 7; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 58 Tex. 170; Strause
et al. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. C. Ct. 104; Lane v. The Montreal
Tel. Co., 7 U. C. P. R. 23; -Davis v. V. U. Tel. Co., 1 Cin.
Sup. Ct. 100; Behm v. W. U. Tel. Co., 8 Biss. 131; Svencer v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 6 Daly 200.
-Davis v. V. U. Tel. Co., supra, is the only reported telegraph
case in which vindictive damages have been allowed. The plain-
tiff was a commercial news agent who was engaged in furnishing
reports as to the markets, to business men. The defendant had, by
a general order given an unlawful precedence to a rival agency,
and in that way ruined the plaintiff's business. In pursuance of
its general policy it delayed forwarding a dispatch from one of the
plaintiff's agents at lNew York, concerning the market, and gave
precedence to a dispatch of the rival agency, which was forwarded
to Cincinnati where the plaintiff did business and there published
before the plaintiff's dispatch was delivered. The plaintiff there-
upon brought his action on the case for damages occasioned by the
delay in that instance and also for the damage to his business caused
by the defendant's habitual misconduct, and he was held to be -
entitled .to exemplary, as well as compensatory damages.
§ 13. injury to the Feelings.-In the case of Gulf, &c., Railway
Co. v. Levy, (Tex.) 28 Alb. L. J. 192, the action was on the case
for -failing to deliver to the appellee, a telegram from his son,
informing him of the death of the latter's wife and child and asking
him to come to the sender's help. The appellee alleged that he had
suffered the keenest disappointment and the sorest grief at being
deprived of the privilege of being present at the burial of his
daughter-in-law and grandchild, of relieving his son of his wants,
of sympathising with him in his sad bereavement and trial, and had
been damaged in his feelings and otherwise to the sum of 85000.
There was no evidence of any pecuniary injury and the court
held, overruling ilille v. W. U. Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 310, that damages
for mental sufferings can only be allowed where some pecuniary
injury from the act causing such sufferings, is shown.
The only other telegraph case, except .Rille's case, supra, in
which damages for mental sufferings have been asked, is the case
of Logan v. W. U. Tel. Co., 84 Ill. 468, which was brought by the
